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Abstract
Europeans restricted their fertility long before other parts of the world did so. By raising the marriage age
of women, and ensuring that a substantial proportion remained celibate, the "European Marriage Pattern"
(EMP) reduced childbirths by up to 40%. We analyze the rise of this ﬁrst socio-economic institution in
history that limited fertility through delayed marriage. Our model emphasizes changes in agricultural pro-
duction following the Black Death. The production of meat, wool, and dairy (pastoral products) increased,
while grain production declined. Women had a comparative advantage producing pastoral goods. They
often worked as servants in husbandry, where they remained unmarried long after they had left the parental
household. In a Malthusian world, this translated into lower population pressure, raising average wages
by up to a quarter. The Black Death thus set into motion a virtuous circle of higher wages and fertility
decline that underpinned Europe’s high per capita incomes. We demonstrate the importance of this effect
in a calibration of our model.
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11 Introduction
Fertility decline is a key feature of the transition to self-sustaining growth. A large literature in economics
seeks to explain why fertility fell at the same time as incomes began to grow after 1850, emphasizing
the greater importance of child quality (Barro and Becker, 1989) or cultural factors associated with the
demographic transition (Princeton Fertility Project). What is not well-understood is how fertility became a
choice variable at all. Long before the advent of modern growth, Europeans restricted their fertility: Women
often married as late in Europe before 1750 as they did in the late 20th century.1 Since medieval times, in
an area West of a line from St Petersburg to Trieste, the age of marriage for women was not determined by
biological fertility, but by socio-economic forces (Hajnal, 1965).2 Both the marriage age and the proportion
of women never marrying varied in response to economic conditions. The so-called ‘European Marriage
Pattern’ (EMP) combined late marriage with unrestricted fertility within marriage. It also constitutes a
puzzle. EMP required a large share of the female population never to engage in sexual activity; for the rest,
abstinence until their twenties was necessary.3 Effectively, Europeans traded off higher living standards –
more goods, and more food – for less sex, and fewer offspring.
EMP contributed to higher incomes. By 1700, European incomes were far above subsistence. In the
view of many scholars, the continent also produced more per capita than the rest of the world (Maddison,
2001; Broadberry and Gupta, 2005).4 Since technological change was slow, other factors must have been
responsible for high output (Voigtländer and Voth, 2009). On average, between a quarter and 40% of all
possible births were avoided as a result of EMP (Clark, 2007). Since land was in ﬁxed supply, fertility
restriction paid in terms of higher incomes. EMP also acted as a "shock absorber" – fertility restriction
became more severe as times became harder.5 While there is agreement that EMP was a unique social
institution with a large economic impact, there is no widely accepted interpretation of its emergence.
In this paper, we develop a simple Malthusian model with two sectors of agricultural production to
explain the early adoption of fertility restriction in Western Europe. Each sector produces a single good –
grain and ’horn’ (pastoral products). Grain production is performed by peasant households, using male and
female labor. Women are less productive in this sector. Grain-related activities such as plowing, threshing,
and harvesting were typically performed by men because of the great physical strength required. Horn
1For example, average female age at ﬁrst marriage was 25.1 in the UK in 1991 (UK Ofﬁce of National Statistics dataset
ST33212). In the 17th century, the average was 25 (Flinn, 1981). In West Germany the ﬁgure in 1992 was 26.5; it had been 26.4 in
the 17th century (Flinn, 1981).
2The pattern was particularly strong in the North-West of Europe, and weaker in the South. Other areas of the world practiced
fertility control in the form of infanticide. The type of fertility control we seek to explain involves a voluntary decision, possibly
mediated through a socio-economic institution, that avoids births.
3There were few births outside marriage, and knowledge of contraceptive techniques was limited.
4Average urbanization rates reached 10%, and in the most advanced areas, rates were even higher. China, on the other hand,
saw stagnation at a rate of 3% (Maddison, 2001). A group of revisionist historians has questioned the traditional consensus that
labor productivity in Chinese agriculture was low (Li, 1998; Pomeranz, 2000; Goldstone, 2003). Pomeranz in particular has argued
that incomes in the Yangtze were comparable to English ones. Their analysis remains controversial (Brenner and Isett, 2002;
Broadberry and Gupta, 2005).
5Kelly (2005) shows that negative shocks to output as a result of adverse weather led to lower fertility. This helped to stabilize
per capita output.
2production is operated by landlords on large demesnes. Both sexes are equally productive in this sector:
Shepherding, dairying and related activities are less physical labor intensive. Both sectors use land as an
input, but pastoral farms do so more intensively.
The economy is Malthusian – death rates respond to economic conditions. In the initial steady state,
land-labor ratios are low, and so are incomes. Grain cultivation provides most of the food. Female labor is
not used intensively. Then, a mortality shock raises land-labor ratios. The horn technology, using land more
intensively, now becomes viable. Women begin to work in husbandry, which involves dwelling away from
home. Thus, marriage is delayed and fertility declines. While the economy does not lose its Malthusian
characteristics, income gains become sustainable. Low fertility keeps land-labor ratios high – the economy
transitions to a new steady state with a higher per capita income. In addition, the new regime helps to
stabilize incomes. If productivity is temporarily lower, and incomes fall, the marginal utility of consumption
increases. This drives women to work more in pastoral agriculture; fertility falls. This in turn reduces
pressure on land-labor ratios and cushions the impact of negative productivity shocks. As a result, under
EMP, incomes are more stable than they would be without fertility restriction. Eventually, EMP disappears
when aggregate productivity grows beyond a threshold level.
The event that triggered the change to a low-fertility regime in Europe was the Black Death. It killed
between a third and half of the European population. As the number of workers fell, land/labor ratios
increased. Wages were high, and food plentiful. For one-and-a-half centuries, Europe saw a ’golden age of
labor.’6 According to the Malthusian model, this rise should have been temporary. As population recovered,
incomes ought to have returned to pre-plague levels. Yet as late as the 17th and 18th centuries, per capita
output in Northwestern Europe remained 35-50% higher than it had been on the eve of the Black Death
(Maddison, 2007).7
Female labor became more valuable after 1348-50 because higher incomes raised meat, dairy, and wool
consumption. By 1516, when Sir Thomas More wrote of ’man-eating sheep’ in his Utopia, vast parts of
English agricultural land had been converted to sheep pasture.8 Sheep grazing and cattle raising were land-
using and labor-saving. Many laborers could be replaced by a single shepherd or servant in husbandry. At a
time of high wages and abundant land, pastoral farming was a proﬁtable mode of production. Importantly,
it used labor that was relatively cheap: Children and women.
By creating demand for women’s labor, expanded pastoral production enhanced female employment
prospects. It did so through an institution that also curtailed female fertility. Landlords regularly took in
young men and women, housed them and fed them in exchange for labor services.9 Of all workers employed
6Accordingto the classic long-run wage series by Phelps-Brownand Hopkins (1981), 14th century English real wagesmore than
doubled after 1349. More recent studies also show marked increases (Clark, 2005; Apostolides, Broadberry, Campbell, Overton,
and van Leeuwen, 2008).
7If we focus on the wages of farm workers – arguably a better indicator of agricultural output per head – English wages and
output at the early modern trough (in 1600) remain roughly 50% higher than on the eve of Great Plague (Apostolides et al., 2008).
8This was despite repeated interventions by the Crown (in 1489 and 1514) that attempted to stop the conversion of arable lands
(Rodrick, 2004).
9They would also offer them some additional monetary reward which would typically be saved for later use, once servants
formed a new household (Kussmaul, 1981).
3in agriculture, between a third and half were servants. Servants constituted 13% of the English population
between 1574 and 1821. While some of them worked as domestic servants, enhancing the comfort of
their masters, most were employed as ’productive servants.’ Kussmaul (1981) estimates that 60% of the
population aged 15-24 were so employed; most early modern youth worked as servants at some point in
their lives. Since women with children are generally unsuited for ﬁeld work with animals, service also
required that maids remained unmarried.
We are not the ﬁrst to argue that the Black Death caused important changes in the European economy.
Van Zanden (2002) concluded that the rapid rise of the Netherlands during the early modern period owed
much to the economy’s transformation after 1350. Epstein (2000) argued that institutional constraints on
growth were removed, Mancur-Olson-style, by the plague. Herlihy (1997) speculated that the emergence
of fertility restriction may have been linked to the effects of population losses after the plague, and Smith
(1981) suggested that the rise of farm service may have been one of the reasons for greater fertility control.
Finally, Pamuk(2007)surveystheevidencethattheBlackDeathusheredinatransformationoftheEuropean
economy, reducing and then reversing the income gap between Southern and Northwestern Europe. The
nature of the Malthusian world before 1800 is examined inter alia in Clark (2007) and Wrigley, Davies,
Oeppen, and Schoﬁeld (1997).10
Related work on the origins of the European Marriage Pattern includes Devolder (1999), who empha-
sizes the introduction of short-term leaseholds as a factor behind the rise of EMP. Foreman-Peck (2009)
builds a model in which European fertility restriction follows from changes in mortality patterns. The paper
that is closest in focus to ours is de Moor and van Zanden (2005). The authors emphasize the role of Chris-
tianity because it underlines the spiritual importance of an act of the will for marriage to be valid. They
also argue that the rise of a landless proletariat, combined with access to urban labor markets, militated in
favor of women ’taking time to choose’ their marriage partners. Because many parents were landless, they
could not entice their children to stay on the land. Thus, children sought out outside earnings opportunities,
especially when wages were high (such as after the Black Death).
Our paper forms part of a broader body of work on the causes of fertility change. The Princeton Euro-
pean Fertility Project (Coale and Watkins, 1986) argued that culture was crucial for the diffusion of fertility
limitation in the 19th century.11 Much of the work on fertility restriction after 1850 has emphasized ris-
ing returns to investments in child quality (Barro and Becker, 1989). An alternative strand in the literature
focuses on the opportunity cost of female labor (Becker, 1960; Mincer, 1963). Butz and Ward (1979) as
well as Heckman and Walker (1990) ﬁnd evidence that higher male wages raise fertility, while higher fe-
male wages lower them. Schultz (1985) showed that a large part of fertility decline in 19th century Sweden
was driven by world demand increasing the price of butter relative to grain. This raised wages of women
working in husbandry, who in turn delayed marriage. Attention has also focused on the changing cost of
children as a result of nineteenth-century compulsory schooling laws and factory acts restricting child labor
10The extent to which negative shocks raised death rates and lowered fertility rates is discussed by Anderson and Lee (2002),
Galloway (1988), Crafts and Mills (2008), Nicolini (2007), and Kelly (2005).
11Recent work using disaggregated data for Bavaria and for France has questioned this conclusion (Brown and Guinnane, 2001;
Murphy, 2006).
4(Doepke, 2004; Puerta, 2009). Recently, Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005) have explored
the impact of labor-saving household technology on fertility, while Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz (2007) argue
that one-off negative shocks to the value of female labor can lead to large increases in fertility.12
Relative to this literature, we make a number of contributions. We present the ﬁrst economic model in
which the European Marriage Pattern arises endogenously, in response to a positive, large shock to income.
We focus on the emergence of a new regime in which fertility is both lower on average, and responds
positively to higher wages. In our model, massive fertility restriction arises without a role for human capital,
in contrast to models in the spirit of Barro and Becker (1989). Also, heterogeneity in wages or tastes plays
no role (Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt, 2008). Our approach emphasizes female opportunity cost, as
determined by changes in the structure of agricultural production following the Black Death. Our modeling
exercise is in the spirit of what has been called "Institutional and Comparative Historical Analysis" (Greif,
1998). In effect, we argue that a new socioeconomic institution emerges in response to a sharp change in
factor prices. We are also the ﬁrst to assess quantitatively EMP’s contribution to high European per capita
output, using a calibrated model of the Malthusian economy.
Several papers in the uniﬁed growth tradition are closely related to our work. Uniﬁed Growth Theory
seeks a single explanation of the transition from ’Malthusian stagnation’ to self-sustaining, rapid growth
(Galor, 2005; Hansen and Prescott, 2002; Galor and Weil, 2000; Kremer, 1993). Papers in this literature
typically assume that as growth takes off, the return to human capital rises, which then lowers fertility
(Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990; Lucas, 2002; Jones, 2001).13 The unit of analysis is typically the world
as a whole, not individual countries. Instead, we focus on cross-sectional differences since we seek to pin
down the contribution of fertility to Europe’s precocious rise to riches. We also emphasize the potential for
fertility to change substantially prior to the "take-off," and without changes in the return to human capital. In
our model, permanently higher incomes are solely determined by the proﬁtability of pastoral production.14
We proceed as follows. Section II discusses the historical background and context. In section III, we
present our model of fertility restriction. Next, we calibrate our model. For plausible parameter values, the
same shock to land-labor ratios can lead to the adoption of very different agricultural and fertility regimes
in Europe and China. Section V concludes.
12They argue that the use of women in US wartime production during 1940-45 generated a negative externality for younger
cohorts, who then engaged in more child-bearing.
13Fernandez-Villaverde (2001) presents a model in which the declining relative price of capital during the Industrial Revolution
raises skill premia, and thus generates incentives to trade child quality for quantity.
14Our theoretical setup shares some similarities with Galor and Weil (1996), where the complementarity between capital and
labor is stronger for women than for men. In their model, technological change drives the entire transition. An initial gain in capital
intensity leads to fertility decline through a rise in the opportunity cost of female time. This then increases incomes, which also
causes capital-deepening. In contrast to their setup, we are not trying to model a transition to self-sustaining growth. Rather, we
emphasize the emergence of a new institution that underpins higher per capita output.
52 Historical Context and Background
In this section, we discuss the historical background and context of EMP’s emergence. We ﬁrst survey the
available evidence about the rise of fertility limitation in Europe, and then summarize changes in agricultural
production and consumption after the Black Death. Next, we examine the connection between nuptiality
and the organization of agricultural production, and describe EMP’s decline after 1750. Finally, we compare
European and Chinese fertility patterns.
2.1 The Origins of the European Marriage Pattern
The European Marriage Pattern has four deﬁning characteristics – a high percentage of women never mar-
rying, a late female marriage, few births out of wedlock, and unrestricted fertility within marriage.15 The
emergence of late marriage is the single most striking – and the seemingly most "modern" – feature of EMP.
It can be traced with reasonable accuracy before the arrival of the Black Death. In the European parts of the
Roman Empire, it was 12-15 for pagan girls, and somewhat higher for Christian girls. Age at marriage in
the Middle Ages appears to be have been somewhat higher than in Roman times, but not by a large margin.
For a group of medieval Lincolnshire villages, Hallam (1985) estimated ages at ﬁrst marriage for women of
around 20. Thus, both a marriage age above the biological age of fertility, and some women never marrying,
probably originated in some areas before the 14th century (Laslett and Wall, 1972). However, the European
Marriage Pattern, with marriage postponed to age 25 and beyond, emerged fully after the Black Death (Ha-
jnal, 1965, 1982). England in the early modern period registered an average age at ﬁrst marriage for women
of 26 years, and 17.5% never married. Scandinavia saw even higher ages at ﬁrst marriage, but total fertility
rates were greater than in England.16 Table 1 gives an overview of the range of historical experience in the
17th century:
[Insert Table 1 here]
Within marriage, fertility was largely unconstrained. Table 2 shows marital fertility by age group, for
Hutterites (a modern-day Canadian sect practicing no birth control), Western Europe before 1800, and
China. Chinese fertility within marriage was low largely as a result of infanticide, as we discuss below.
In 18th century Germany, some 20% of women married for the ﬁrst time aged 30 and higher (Knodel,
1988).
[Insert Table 2 here]
15The percentage of females never married needs to be established through family reconstitutions, which track cohorts over the
entire life cycle. For the period before 1500, these are not available. Instead, one can look at the proportion of women unmarried
at a particular point in time. Because some women will eventually ﬁnd husbands and have children, this constitutes a strict upper
bound on the percentage never marrying. In St Germain-des-Prés in 801-20, for example, some 16% of adults were unmarried.
Since men greatly outnumbered women, the proportion of unmarried women was probably much less. In the 9th century, in
Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, up to 12% of adults had never married (Hallam, 1985).
16The difference is driven by a higher percentage of women never marrying in England.
6Northwestern Europe in particular evolved a ’low pressure demographic regime’ (Wrigley et al., 1997).
Negative economic shocks were largely absorbed through Malthus’s preventive check (lower nuptiality),
rather than the positive check (death rates surging). As economic conditions worsened, the system became
more restrictive with respect to marriage. As life expectancy fell and conditions became less favorable,
partly under the inﬂuence of declining land-labor ratios in England after 1600, the age at marriage increased,
and gross reproduction rates fell (Wrigley and Schoﬁeld, 1981; Wrigley et al., 1997).
There are many reasons to believe that fertility restriction through late marriage was voluntary. Children
were relatively independent from their parents by their teenage years, and became fully legally independent
at age 21 – several years before the average age of ﬁrst marriage. The law did not ban early marriages. In
England, the legal age for marriage was 12 for women, 14 for men. Early marriages occurred, with the ﬁrst
age at marriage for women ranging from 16 to 45 (Clark, 2007). While the authorities attempted to raise
age at marriage – by having extended apprenticeships, for example – there were plenty of ways to ignore or
circumvent restrictions, especially in the larger towns (Ingram, 1985; Clark, 2007). Nor is there evidence
that the “passion between the sexes” (as Malthus called it) was any less acute in early modern Europe than
elsewhere. One out of seven marriages in 17th century England was followed by the bride giving birth
within 8 months; the proportion could be as high as 40% (Wrigley and Schoﬁeld, 1981).
2.2 Changes in Production and Consumption after the Black Death
Prior to the Black Death, European agriculture suffered from declining labor productivity. Campbell (2000)
argued that before the plague and the hunger crises of the early 14th century, output per head in English
agriculture was falling. The more recent results by Apostolides et al. (2008) show declining agricultural
production per worker and acre before 1350. Diets shifted from pastoral to arable products. These trends
reversed after the Black Death. Immediately after the initial shock in 1348-9, prices of foodstuff collapsed
by 45 percent, while cash wages increased by 25% (Campbell, 2000). These gains did not persist to the
same extent for long, but the Black Death became a turning point for real wages regardless. By 1450, real
wages in England were 50% higher than they had been on the eve of the plague, and more than twice as
high as they had been before the Great Famine of the 1310s and 1320s.
Per capita consumption of food overall increased. As consumers grew richer, their consumption patterns
shifted from ’corn to horn’ (Campbell, 2000). There is ample evidence that ’luxury foods’ such as meat,
ﬁsh, and dairy products accounted for a far greater proportion of food expenditure after 1350 than before.
Where grains had been consumed directly, as porridge or bread, ale-drinking expanded. Meat and milk
consumption increased markedly. Based on changes in the number of non-working animals on farms, it
approximately doubled. Since workers on large estates received some of their payments in kind, we also
have more direct evidence on consumption patterns. Dyer (1988) analyzes the case of English farm workers,
and shows that the percentage of calories coming from meat and ﬁsh rose from 7% in 1256 to 26% in 1424.
By value, average spending increased from 20.5% pre-plague to 38.5% post-plague.
Landowners responded to the changes following the Great Plague in a number of ways. Apostolides
7et al. (2008) summarize changes after 1350 as follows:
"Between the mid-thirteenth century and the mid-fourteenth century, factor costs and property rights
encouraged lords to manage their demesnes directly and concentrate on arable production. Following
the Black Death, however, lords found it ... increasingly expensive to hire wage labour, following a sub-
stantial increase in wage rates. Those lords who continued to farm directly switched away from labour
intensive arable production to mixed husbandry and pastoral production, leaving arable production to
peasants who could rely mainly on family labour ..."
After 1350, pasture replaced arable land at a high rate. Meat and wool production thus came to be
concentrated on the larger estates. Sheep-farming husbandry expanded everywhere, as did the ranching of
cattle. The trend was particularly pronounced in Southern England. Campbell estimates that grain acreage
declined by approximately 15 percent after 1349, while the number of livestock expanded by 40 percent
to meet buoyant demand. Much of the increase was concentrated amongst livestock reared for meat and
milk, which grew by 90 percent. The estimates of Apostolides et al. (2008) suggest that pastoral output (in
constant prices) increased by 22% between 1348 and 1555, while arable output only grew by 7%. Since
population was still below its medieval peak, per capita consumption grew even faster – by more than 40%
by 1550 for pastoral products, while arable output was up by 23% (cf. Table 3). Milk production per head
was up by 150%, beef by 130%, and pork by 280%.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The advantage of switching to pasture for large landowners was twofold. First, it allowed lords to
operate with less labor overall. The evidence suggests that per acre, a farm specializing in husbandry
required 15-25% fewer hands than an arable one. Second, the labor itself was cheaper – women (and partly,
by boys) replaced labor by adult males. On larger farms, moving from arable to pastoral production typically
increased women’s share of the workforce from 19 to 31%; on the smaller ones, from 26 to 34%. Thus, the
switch from ’corn to horn’ also produced a shift in demand from male to female labor.17
Also, average farm size increased after the 14th century. What Allen (1992) called the ’Yeoman’s
enclosure’ (before the Parliamentary enclosures in the 18th century) led to a big rise in farm output between
the plague and the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Some 80% of English farms had been smaller than
twenty acres before the Black Death. By 1600, over 60% were larger than 100 acres. Increasing farm
sizes allowed farmers to use more beasts of burden. Changes in capital intensity facilitated the saving of
expensive (male) labor. Labor productivity began to grow, initially as a result of higher land-labor ratios.
Investment in drainage, marling, and liming was massive. In addition, English farmers used draft animals in
great numbers. By the eighteenth century, the number of horses per worker was 80% higher than in France,
and 40% higher per unit of land (Wrigley, 1988).
17We use information on the composition of employment per acre from Allen (1991), who gives ﬁgures for England in 1770, for
various farm sizes. We use his values for 100 (small) and 250 (large farms), and employ the size distributions in Allen (1988).
82.3 Farm Service and Fertility Restriction
As in most agricultural societies, children in their teens and twenties worked in Northwestern Europe – but
they did so in an unusual way. An Italian visitor to England in the 16th century marveled at the fact that
most parents would send their children away at an early age "for another 7 or 9 years... and few are born
who are exempt from this fate" (McIsaac Cooper, 2005). As we have seen, apprenticeships and service
in agriculture were a standard part of an English adolescent’s life. We brieﬂy summarize how service in
husbandry became a key institution that raised marriage ages in early modern England.
After 1349, all types of labor, including female labor, became more expensive. This partly reﬂected the
changing patterns of agricultural production. As horn production increased, so did the labor demands of
pastoral farming. Landlords increasingly hired ’productive servants’ to help on the larger farms (Kussmaul,
1981). Pastoralism has fairly evenly-spread labor requirements throughout the year. This makes it attractive
to employ servants year-round, instead of hiring agricultural laborers on daily wages. The latter, used
mainly in the arable areas, are more suited to a production cycle characterized by a brief period of peak
labor demand during the harvest season. Pastoralism and the processing of its products is also singularly
suited to the employment of women (Smith, 1981). Work as shepherdesses, as milkmaids or in spinning
wool required less physical strength than plow agriculture.
For women and men, life as a servant in husbandry involved a commitment to remain unmarried. The
MuseumRusticum, an18thcenturyperiodicalonruralaffairs, calledservice"acovenantedstateofcelibacy."
Marriage typically implied an immediate termination of service. Kussmaul (1981) calculates that 65% of
servants married immediately before or after the end of their contracts.18 The reason for these strict rules
is that servants were entitled to room and board in exchange for labor services. Marriage and childbearing
reduces female labor supply, and makes it more variable. As such, it would have been incompatible with the
labor requirements in pastoral agriculture. Thus, as Macfarlane (1970) observed, "the system of farming out
the children, which permitted them a moderate freedom without forcing them to resort to marriage, allowed
them to marry late."
Women’s service in husbandry reduced fertility rates by delaying marriage. This is most evident in the
cross-section of ages at ﬁrst marriage, documented by Kussmaul (1981). Figure 1 shows the connection
with fertility. The larger the proportion of farm servants in total labor, the higher the proportion of females
unmarried. We conclude that there is good prima facie evidence that more pastoral production was linked
to fertility restriction through the institution of farm service.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
2.4 The Decline of EMP
English fertility increased rapidly during the second half of the eighteenth century. The causes of this
marked change are not well-known, but a number of hypotheses have been advanced (Wrigley, 1983).
18She also notes that in a number of cases, female servants were permitted to stay in the house of their master for the remaining
duration of their contracts.
9Initially, England had a particularly strong, "low-pressure" form of the European Marriage pattern, with late
marriages and low rates of illegitimacy. After the 1730s, mean ages at ﬁrst marriage began to trend down
for both men and women. By the 1830s, they had fallen from 26 for women (and 27 for men) in 1700 to 23
(and 25, respectively). Illegitimacy, which had accounted for a mere 1% in the 1650s, rose to more than 6%
after 1800. Population growth accelerated from zero to 1.75% per annum (Wrigley et al., 1997).19
As the eighteenth century wore on, a number of factors reduced female employment opportunities in
husbandry. Snell (1981) argues that as grain prices rose in the 18th century relative to the price of meat and
dairy products, pastoral production declined. In addition, land productivity in English agriculture began to
rise after 1700 (Apostolides et al., 2008). Since meat production was more land-using than grain production,
this made pastoralism overall less proﬁtable. However, lower wages for female labor alone cannot be a
sufﬁcient explanation – based on the classic pattern in early modern England, this would simply raise the
marriage age.
The institution of farm service for young women itself was gradually vanishing, as a result of economic
change. The seasonal peaks in marriage patterns became smaller after the 17th century. There were typically
two pronounced peaks in the frequency of marriages – in May/June and September/October. These reﬂected
the end of the hiring cycle for servants – spring in husbandry, after the lambing season, and fall in arable
farming, after the harvest. Marriages celebrated after the lambing and shearing season brought the typical
work-year in pastoral agricultural to an end. Importantly, as Kussmaul (1988) shows, the overall marriage
age and the proportion of spring marriages fell in tandem. Spring marriages became markedly less important
after 1700 (Figure 2). Thus, late marriage and horn production declined in parallel.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
As agricultural employment as a percentage of the total fell, the annual hiring cycle for servants in
agriculture left less and less of a trace in the seasonality of marriages. Cottage shop manufacturing offered a
chance to earn a living, while already having children.20 For a given decline in the land-labor ratio, female
wages fell by less; thus women could marry earlier, and still earn the same. The decline of England’s low
fertility regime may therefore have been brought on by the same factors that determined its rise during the
early modern period – changes in the opportunity cost of female labor in the late teens and early twenties,
as determined by employment conditions for servants in husbandry.
2.5 Chinese Demography
For women, marriage occurred early and was near-universal in China. For the period 1640-1870, the per-
centage of women not married by age 30 ranged from 4% in Beijing to 1% in Liaoning (Lee and Feng,
19Wrigley (1983) examined the contribution of fertility to the acceleration in population growth after 1750. Some of the under-
lying data has been revised by Wrigley et al. (1997), but the relative contributions of fertility increase and mortality decline have
not been recalculated.
20The effect on marriage age is not always clear-cut. Some studies ﬁnd a decline in the age at ﬁrst marriage for women in
proto-industrializing areas; others show that higher nuptiality preceded the spread of cottage-shop manufacturing (cf. Hudson,
1996).
101999). The age at ﬁrst marriage for women was also low. Amongst members of the Imperial Qing family
in Beijing, age at ﬁrst marriage was 15.5-19 years in the 17th century. By 1840, it had risen to 22 years.
Marriage outside the urban areas, and amongst those not belonging to the nobility, probably continued to
occur much earlier. In the early 20th century, Chinese women on average married aged 17.5 (Lee, Feng, and
Ruan, 2001). For men, the same is not true. A signiﬁcant proportion remained unmarried by age 30. The
main reason was the unavailability of women. Due to female infanticide, and the practice of taking multiple
wives, many men could not marry. The overall proportion in 1800 was around 22%, compared to 45% in
England, Norway, and Sweden. The average age at marriage for men was 21-22 (Lee and Feng, 1999).
The extent to which Chinese demography resulted in higher fertility and greater pressure on living
standards is controversial. While female marriage occurred early and was almost universal (and only female
nuptiality matters for demographic growth), infanticide and fertility limitation within marriage reduced
population growth rates (Lee and Feng, 1999; Feng, Lee, and Campbell, 1995; Wolf, 2001). This would
suggest that, contrary to Malthus’ famous claim, Chinese fertility was not ’unconstrained.’ In addition, data
from the 19th century suggests that Chinese birth rates were around 35/1000, only slightly higher than early
modern European ones (Clark, 2007). This could be interpreted as a sign that differences between European
and Chinese fertility behavior have been overstated. Yet Chinese incomes were much lower. Thus – since
European fertility increased in wages – fertility rates were higher in China than in Europe for any given
wage.
We do not take a stand on the broader issue whether China experienced greater population pressure.
Delayed marriage constitutes a key difference in behavior compared with China. It also clearly reduced
fertility in Europe. Whether infanticide and lower fertility within marriage in the Far East achieved similar
effects is not crucial for our argument.21
3 Model
This section presents a simple model of what determined pre-industrial labor supply and marriage decisions.
The economy is composed of N female and N male peasants who work, consume, and procreate.22 People
live for two periods, childhood and adulthood. Children do not work or consume. Adult peasants form
couples and make joint decisions to maximize household utility, facing a tradeoff between female work
time and having children. Adulthood is equivalent to the fertile years in a woman’s life. For simplicity, we
assume that wages are the only source of income for peasants.
There are two technologies to produce consumption goods. Both use land and peasant labor as inputs.
21We note in passing that Chinese population size increased by a factor of over 5 between 1400 and 1820, while Europe only
grew by a factor of 3.2 – annual population growth rates were 0.4% and 0.28%, respectively (Maddison, 2001). In other words,
Chinese population growth was approximately 1/3 faster than in Europe.
22We call all economic agents that are not large landowners ’peasants’ (landholders subsisting by working a small plot). This is
a useful description for all countries except England, where there were no peasants in the strict sense of the word. Instead, most
tenant farms were relatively large (as we discuss in section 4), and were often operated with hired labor. We use the ’peasant’
terminology for simplicity. In our model, it merely implies that large landowners have an advantage producing pastoral products
compared to ’peasants.’
11Grain production is labor-intensive, while horn production (cow-herding and sheep-farming) uses relatively
more land. In addition, grain production requires arduous physical labor. Thus, men are more productive
than women. In less strenuous pastoral labor, men and women are equally productive. A landlord owns
all land T, which is in ﬁxed supply. He does not work. Peasants rent land Tg for grain production. On
the remaining land Th = T ¡ Tg, the landlord operates large-scale horn production, hiring peasant labor.
Historically, cattle ranches and sheep farms have been much larger than arable farms. Therefore, we assume
that only the landlord disposes of demesnes large enough for commercial horn production; peasants can
only grow grain on the lots that they rent.
Male and female adult peasants are endowed with one unit of time each, which they split optimally
between arable and pastoral production. With a sufﬁciently large comparative advantage in the arduous
grain production, men decide to work only in this sector. When married and living together with their
spouse, women also work in grain production on the rented soil. However, their marginal product is low. In
order to work in pastoral production (husbandry), women are required to be unmarried and dwell away from
home at the landlord’s demesne. Thus, peasant couples face a tradeoff of raising children versus female
work in the potentially more rewarding horn sector.
The economy is Malthusian – the steady state income level depends on fertility and mortality schedules.
The latter declines in consumption. Fertility, on the other hand, is endogenous and depends on the age at
marriage. Before marriage, women do not have children. During marriage, there is no birth control and
children arrive with frequency ¼. Delaying marriage is therefore the only ’contraception technology.’ We
deﬁne the European Marriage Pattern as follows:
Deﬁnition. Let b be the birth rate when women spend all their adult life married. Then EMP is a demo-
graphic regime that involves (i) b < b because women remain unmarried throughout a part of adulthood,
and (ii) b increases in p.c. income.
Our model describes how EMP can emerge as a consequence of major population losses; it also analyzes
productivity characteristics that favor the emergence of EMP. An epidemic like the plague causes land-labor
ratios to rise dramatically. This leaves the remaining population with greater per-capita income. As long
as birth and death schedules are unchanged, the economy returns to its earlier equilibrium – any escape
from Malthusian stagnation is temporary. However, in our model, the plague prompts the landlord to shift
production from ’corn to horn.’ Cattle and sheep farming use the abundant factor of production – land –
and can be operated with cheap labor – that of women. Thus, the demand for female labor rises, and so do
female wages. Women work in horn production for part of their life, which requires them to dwell away
from home. Thus, they marry later. The European Marriage Pattern is born. We argue that this mechanism
captures an important element of the European experience in the centuries between the Black Death and the
Industrial Revolution. Because of later marriage, the birth schedule shifts downward (property (i) of EMP).
In addition, a subsistence effect makes birth rates increasing in income (property (ii)). The new steady state
has lower birth rates, combined with higher per capita incomes. This mechanism can explain the slow rise
of population levels after 1349, and the persistence of higher output per capita.
123.1 Household Formation and Fertility
Adult peasants live for one period. At the beginning of each period, male and female peasants meet and
form N couples. Independent of whether or not they live in the same location, they make decisions jointly,
maximizing household utility. Male and female peasants each provide one unit of labor per period and
allocate it to grain and horn production. For simplicity, we ensure that the male comparative advantage in
grain production is large enough such that men only work in this sector. Men’s contribution to household
income is thus equal to the male wage rate in grain production, wM;g. Women split their labor supply
between the two sectors. When working in husbandry (horn production), peasants are required to dwell
away from home at the landlord’s location. Marriage is not allowed, and women live separated from their
ﬁancé while earning the wage wh.23 The fraction lh of adult lifetime that female peasants work in horn
production is endogenously determined; it can be interpreted as the celibate period for both men and women.
The probability of childbearing is zero during this period. After marrying, man and wife move in together,
and women work in peasant grain production at home. Their marginal product in this sector is given bywF;g.
The fraction 1 ¡ lh is the share of lifetime that couples are married. There is no contraception. Married
couples produce ¼ births per unit of time.24 Therefore, the number of offspring per couple is given by
b = ¼(1 ¡ lh) (1)
The share of lifetime married also corresponds to female labor supply in peasant grain production, lF;g =
1 ¡ lh.25 Female labor supply in horn production, lh, is thus determined by the trade-off between relative
female wage income in horn vs. grain, wh=wF;g, and child rearing during marriage. When the horn sector
does not operate, lh = 0 and b = b = ¼.
Deathratesamongadultsarezerountilagivenperiodisover. Overallmortalityisthusdrivenexclusively
by child mortality.26 The survival of children depends on average peasant consumption. The number of




where 'd < 0 is the elasticity of child mortality with respect to average consumption of peasant households
( ¹ Cp), and d0 is the death rate at subsistence consumption c.27 Consequently, child mortality falls as p.c.
income rises. Note that below subsistence consumption, individuals suffer from hunger, but do not neces-
sarily die – mortality increases continuously as ¹ Cp falls below c. At the end of each period, parents die and
23Because only women work in horn production, we do not need extra subscripts for male or female peasants; the subscript h is
sufﬁcient.
24For simplicity, we treat ¼ as a deterministic frequency, rather than as probability draws. In addition, we assume that child
mortality does not directly inﬂuence birth rates. Thus, there is no role for precautionary children in our model.
25We thus implicitly assume that working at home in grain production is compatible with raising children. In addition, the fact
that female peasants spent much of their time caring for children is a further justiﬁcation for their relatively lower productivity in
grain production.
26Historically, child mortality was the main driver of overall life expectancy.
27A historical justiﬁcation for child mortality depending on average (rather than individual) income is that its main cause were
diseases like diarrhea and typhus, whose spread depends on hygienic conditions (and therefore income) in the community.
13surviving offspring form the next adult generation.
There is no investment or bequests to children – all income is spent for consumption during the adult
period of life. Both men and women draw utility from the number of children and from consuming two
goods: Grain (cp;g) and horn products (meat, milk, wool – denoted by cp;h). We use grain as the numeraire;
the price of horn goods is denoted by ph. In order to focus on the main mechanism, we simplify the analysis
by assuming that grain and horn products are perfect substitutes, such that the composite consumption index
is given by Cp = cp;g + cp;h. Conveniently, this implies that the price of grain equals the price of horn,
provided that the latter is produced. Consequently, ph = 1. Relative price effects thus do not inﬂuence our
results.28 The household budget constraint takes the form Cp · Ip, where peasant household’s income is
given by
Ip = wM;g + wF;g(1 ¡ lh) + whlh : (3)
Because men work only in grain production, they contribute wM;g to household income. Women split their
labor supply between grain and horn, as represented by the second and third term in (3), respectively.
When household income is large enough to allow above-subsistence consumption, household utility is
given by
u(Cp;b) = (1 ¡ ¹)ln(Cp ¡ c) + ¹ln(b ¡ b); if Ip > c (4)
where ¹ 2 (0;1) represents the relative importance of children vs. consumption for peasant families. This
is similar to Galor and Weil (1996) and is a special case of Jones’ (2001) model.29 We do not explicitly
model utility for the below-subsistence case. Instead, we assume that the marginal utility of consumption is
large but not inﬁnity in this case, such that households still have at least b children.
The landlord does not work and does not draw utility from children. Therefore, he does not inﬂuence
fertility directly. The landlord has the same consumption preferences as peasants, Ck = ck;h + ck;g.30 His
only source of income are land rents, rT, and his budget constraint is given by Ck · rT.
Given wM;g, wF;g, and wh, peasant households maximize (4) subject to the time constraint 0 · lh · 1,
the birth rate given by (1), and their budget constraint. In the absence of bequests and investments, the latter
holds with equality, i.e., Cp = Ip. The household optimization problem is then given by
max
lh
f(1 ¡ ¹)ln[wM;g + whlh + wF;g(1 ¡ lh) ¡ c] + ¹ln[¼(1 ¡ lh) ¡ b]g (5)
28Of course, perfect substitutability between two types of food is a strong assumption. However, evidence suggests a high
elasticity. We already discussed the large rise in the share of calories coming from meat and ﬁsh in England after the Black Death.
In other areas of the world, where populations of European origin were faced with cheap and abundant meat (such as in Argentina),
consumption also grew massively. In the 1980s, Argentine beef consumption was 70-80 kg per capita, twice as high as in the US
(Jaffee and Gordon, 1993). In the 19th century, it may have been as high as 120 kg (Salvatore, 2004).
29In a more general setup, rising income in a rich economy (Ip >> c) has two effects: An income effect (richer peasants want
both more children and consumption) and a substitution effect (a shift away from children towards work, which becomes more
rewarding with increasing productivity). In our setup with log-preferences, income and substitution effect cancel each other. This
choice allows us to focus on the subsistence effect that operates when Ip is close to c, as well as on the effect of relative wages in
horn production on female labor supply.
30While land-owners were not consuming goods in the same proportions as peasants, the staff they employed in large numbers
were. We abstract from any systematic differences for ease of exposition. To avoid confusions with labor l, we use the subscript k
for the landlord – recalling that kings owned large land areas may serve as a mnemonic.
14The optimization problem is static, which simpliﬁes our analysis. This is similar in spirit to Jones
(2001) and can be derived from a more general dynamic optimization problem under two assumptions that
we have made. First, utility depends on the ﬂow of births rather than on the stock of children. That is,
parents care about their own children, but not about their children’s offspring. Second, we assume in (2) that
child mortality depends on average per capita consumption. Since households take average consumption as
given, child mortality does not interfere with optimal labor supply decisions. With these assumptions, the
more general dynamic optimization problem (e.g., Barro and Becker, 1989) reduces to a sequence of static
problems as given in (5).
3.2 Technology and Location of Production
Production technologies of both grain (g), and horn (h) use labor and land as inputs. Grain is produced
according to:





where Ag is TFP, ®g is the labor share in grain production, Tg is land dedicated to grain, and c Lg denotes
effective peasant grain-labor supply. The latter is given by:
b Lg = LM;g + ½LF;g : (7)
where LM;g and LF;g denote male and female grain-labor input, respectively. While both types of labor are
perfectly substitutable, men have a relative advantage compared to women because grain farming requires
intense physical labor, such as ploughing, threshing, and reaping. We capture this fact by the parameter
½ < 1.
The horn technology is less labor-, and more land-intensive than arable production. This is represented






where Ah denotes TFP, Th is land, and Lh is total labor input in horn production. Men and women are
equally productive in the horn sector. However, below we choose parameters such that male wages in grain
exceed those in horn production. Hence, male peasants only work in arable agriculture on the soil they rent,
while female peasants allocate their time between grain and horn. This simpliﬁes our analysis, but is not
crucial for the main result. With only women working in horn and the number of female peasants equalling
the number of households, we have Lh = N ¡ LF;g.
We assume that the horn technology is only available to owners of large land areas, i.e., to the landlord
in our model. Historically, this is motivated by the size differences of farms in areas of pastoral vs. arable
cultivation (Campbell, 2000). Analytically, a minimum land requirement for horn production would provide
an alternative speciﬁcation with similar implications for who engages in production. To save on notation
and concentrate on the main mechanism, we do not model this dimension explicitly. Instead we assume that
15only the landlord produces horn. This assumption is important because it ensures that women have to leave
the peasant household to work in pastoral farming.
The landlord owns an area T of land. He leases a part Tg to peasants and operates pastoral farming
on the remainder Th = T ¡ Tg, hiring peasant workers at their marginal product.31 The split of land
is determined endogenously as shown below. We normalize land by the number of peasant households:
t = T=N represents the aggregate land-labor ratio, whiletg = Tg=N and th = Th=N are land per household
in grain and horn, respectively.32
Each peasant household therefore rents land tg. Because peasants do not have access to the large-scale
horn technology, they use all their rented land to produce grain. Consequently, there is a clear division
of production by location: Peasants grow grain on rented land close to their dwellings, while the landlord
operates horn production on separated large demesnes. However, the horn technology is not always in
operation. We discuss the corresponding mechanism in detail below.
This completes the basic setup of our model. Next, we derive factor payments and show how land is
allocated between grain and horn production. In addition, we examine the female labor supply decision.
3.3 Factor Payments and Allocation of Labor
Peasant households optimally allocate their labor supply between working on rented soil – paying rents to
the landlord while keeping the remaining output – and working for the landlord in horn production at the
wage rate wh. While male peasants work only in grain production, female peasants optimally split their
labor allocation between horn and grain. When growing grain on rented land, the marginal product of male












where b lg = b Lg=N is effective labor supply per household in grain production. When married and working
at home in grain growing, women’s marginal product is below the male one, and is given by
wF;g = ½ wM;g (10)
Since men only work in grain and there are N male peasants, we have LM;g=N = 1. In addition,
LF;g=N + Lh=N = lF;g + lh = 1 must hold because women work one unit of time. Using (7), we can thus
express effective labor in grain production per household as a function of the share of female lifetime spent
working in horn, lh:
b lg = 1 + ½(1 ¡ lh) : (11)
31Alternatively, we could assume that landlords manage the production on all their land, paying grain and horn workers their
marginal product. The crucial assumption for our mechanism is that large-scale horn production requires the corresponding workers
to dwell away from home.
32Strictly speaking, the aggregate land-labor ratio is given by T=(2N), accounting for female labor. However, we refer to the
proportional term T=N in the following.







We choose sectoral TFPs such that wh < wM;g for the relevant range of aggregate land-labor ratios. This
ensures that male peasants work only in grain production while all labor in horn is provided by women.
Peasant households pay the rental rate rg, while the return to land in horn production is rh, as given by:











Optimal allocation of the soil operated by the landlord requires that the land return in grain and horn pro-

















This equation says that land per effective worker in grain is proportional to its productivity-adjusted coun-
terpart in horn production, provided that the landlord operates the latter. Land per effective labor in grain
relative to horn increases in (i) in the TFP ratios – relatively more land is dedicated to the more productive
technology, and (ii) in the land-intensity of grain relative to horn, as governed by ®g and ®h. Note that
because of (i), countries with high TFP in grain production dedicate relatively less land to horn. This will
become decisive when we compare Europe with China.
Much of our analysis relies on changes in the aggregate land-labor ratio t. The following proposition
shows how sector-speciﬁc land-labor ratios change with their aggregate counterpart.
Proposition 1. If both technologies operate and the aggregate land-labor ratio t = T=N grows, then the
ratio of land to (effective) labor increases in both sectors, i.e.,
d(tg=b lg)
dt > 0 and
d(th=lh)
dt > 0.
PROOF. If both technologies operate and land per household t increases, market clearing implies that land-
labor ratios must increases in at least one of the two sectors. Following (14), d(tg=b lg)=dt and d(th=lh)=dt
have the same sign. Consequently, both derivatives are positive.















We have now obtained all wage rates as functions of the land-labor ratio in horn, th=lh. Finally, we derive
the ratio that determines whether or not the horn technology operates: The relative return to female labor in























The return to female labor in horn vs. grain is therefore driven by three components in our model.33 First,
if grain technology is highly productive relative to horn technology (Ah=Ag is small), female wages in horn
are relatively low. Second, the same is true if women are very productive in grain (½ is high). Finally, and
most important for our mechanism, wh=wF;g grows when land becomes more abundant, as the following
corollary shows.
Corollary 1. Provided that both sectors operate, the relative female wage in horn is increasing in the
aggregate land-labor ratio: d(wh=wF;g)=dt > 0.
PROOF. Since ®g > ®h and d(th=lh)=dt > 0, this result follows from deriving (16) with respect to t.
Workers in the more land-intensive horn technology proﬁt relatively more from increases in farmland.
Conversely, if land is scarce because of population pressure, wh is below wF;g. In this case female workers
do not supply labor in horn production. For higher land-labor ratios, the relative wage exceeds one, and
it becomes increasingly attractive for female peasants to work in the horn sector. Because this requires
dwelling away from home, marriage is delayed and EMP can emerge. We argue that this mechanism reﬂects
the European experience after the Black Death, where land-labor ratios nearly doubled within a few years.
3.4 Fertility, Female Labor Supply, and Emergence of EMP
The missing piece to close our model is female labor supply. We derive it as a function of male and female
wage rates. As a ﬁrst step, household optimization (5) yields:






This equation holds under two conditions. First, the relative wage condition wh > wF;g; otherwise the horn
technology does not operate and women marry at the beginning of the period, giving birth to ¼ children.
Assume for now that wh > wF;g is satisﬁed. Second, (17) entails an income condition: Ip > c, i.e., that
peasant household income is sufﬁcient to grant above-subsistence consumption. With income approaching
the subsistence level, birth rates converge to b. Because we assume that the marginal utility of consumption
approaches inﬁnity for below-subsistence consumption, b = b holds whenever Ip · c. Note that female
labor in horn is at its upper bound when fertility is at its minimum b. That is, women cannot work more
than lh = 1¡b=¼ in horn production because otherwise fertility drops below b. Therefore, we have lh = lh
whenever horn is viable (wh > wF;g) and Ip · c. The corresponding household income is then given by
33In a more general setup with imperfect substitutability between grain and horn products, there is a third component: wh=wF;g
is additionally increasing in the relative price of horn products. If ph is large, wh is high, and the horn technology is employed.
This reinforces our mechanism because meat and wool were luxury goods – demand for horn products thus surged when incomes
rose after the plague.
18Ip(lh) = wM;g + wF;g(1 ¡ lh) + whlh. Note that Ip(lh) is increasing in t. We can thus use the income
condition Ip(lh) · c together with the relative wage condition to pin down the behavior of female labor in
horn. Using (3), we solve (17) for lh.
lh =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0; if wh · wF;g
lh; if wh > wF;g and Ip(lh) · c
(1 ¡ ¹)lh ¡ ¹
wM;g+wF;g ¡ c
wh¡wF;g ; if wh > wF;g and Ip(lh) > c
(18)
Figure 3 illustrates the two conditions used in (18). The upper panel depicts both wh=wF;g and Ip=c as
functions of land available per peasant household, T=N. Wages in grain and horn (and therefore household
incomeIp)growwithT=N. Inaddition, asshowninCorollary1, therelativewagewh=wF;g growswithland
per household. The lower panel in Figure 3 relates the two conditions with female labor supply in horn (lh).
We begin with low T=N. Because of the relative wage condition (dashed line), work in horn is worthwhile
only if it pays more than the marginal product in grain production at home. Thus, for wh=wF;g · 1,
women do not work in horn, such that lh = 0. Growing T=N eventually leads to wh=wF;g > 1, making
the horn sector attractive for female labor (beyond point A). The exact level of lh then depends on the
income condition, depicted by the solid line in the upper panel. If T=N – and thus income – is low, i.e., if
Ip(lh)=c · 1, peasants are close to starvation. In this case households supply the maximum possible female
labor in horn, lh, in order to add the wage premium wh > wF;g to income.
Further increases in T=N ﬁnally allow above-subsistence consumption (point B, where Ip=c = 1). With
T=N risingbeyondthispoint, twoeffectsgovernfemalelaborsupplydecisionsinthethirdlineof(18). First,
a relative wage effect leads to rising work in horn when wh increases relative to wF;g. Second, a subsistence
effect implies falling female labor in horn production as income grows. To understand the subsistence effect,
let us analyze a relatively poor economy, where Ip is close to, but larger than, the expenditure needed for
subsistence consumption, c. Thus, lh is below its upper bound. Now suppose that productivity falls at the
same rate in both grain and horn, pulling income yet closer to the subsistence level but leaving wh=wF;g
unchanged. Then the marginal utility of consumption rises dramatically. Therefore, for a given premium
wh > wF;g, female peasants shift labor supply to the horn sector, delaying marriage and giving birth to fewer
children over their lifetime.34 Consequently, the subsistence effect implies that income and female labor
shares in horn move in opposite directions. For our choice of parameters the subsistence effect dominates
when income is small, while the relative wage effect eventually prevails when income is large.35
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure3alsoillustratesacrucialconditionfortheemergenceofEMP.Thesubsistenceeffectisimportant
only if B lies to the right of A, that is, when labor in horn becomes viable at a T=N where households
are poor. This generates strong incentives for female peasants to work in horn for the wage premium
34With declining productivity, this continues until the number of children falls to b, where lh = lh.
35For large T=N, lh becomes eventually upward sloping (not depicted in Figure 3).
19wh > wF;g. The following proposition states the conditions under which EMP emerges as a consequence of
major population losses.








Ip=c , i.e., if the horn
technology becomes economically viable at land-labor-ratios that do not yet grant subsistence consumption.
PROOF: See Appendix A.1.
Graphically, Proposition2saysthatpointAinFigure3hastobetotheleftofpointBforEMPtoemerge.
In other words, EMP emerges when income is below subsistence at the point where horn becomes viable. If
this holds, the subsistence effect (making work in horn more necessary for smaller T=N) overcompensates
the relative wage effect (making work in horn more attractive as T=N rises). Thus, on net, lh falls in
T=N – and birth rates rise – at least over some range of T=N. On the other hand, if A lies to the right
of B, the income effect more than offsets the substitution effect, and EMP does not emerge. The proof of
the proposition builds on this intuition. Proposition 2 has implications for the relative productivity across
sectors and genders that allow EMP to emerge. We assume that the densely populated pre-plague economy
has land-labor ratios below the ones in point A. The plague raises T=N dramatically. Corollary 2 discusses
under which condition this leads to the emergence of EMP.
Corollary 2. The following properties favor the emergence of EMP in response to large population losses:
(i) TFP in the grain sector, Ag, is relatively low, (ii) TFP in the horn sector, Ah, is relatively high, and (iii)
women are relatively unproductive in grain production (½ is relatively small).
PROOF: See Appendix A.2.
We show in section 4 that conditions (i)-(iii) were more likely to hold in Europe than in China when
both regions were hit by the plague in the 14th century. Before turning to this comparison, we simulate our
model and illustrate the main results.
3.5 Solving the Model for Given Land-Labor Ratios
In this section we solve for wages, female labor supply, and birth rates for given land-labor ratios t. We
assume that the condition in Proposition 2 holds and distinguish three cases for the model economy: (a) a
land-abundant one, where both technologies operate and female labor in horn is below its upper bound lh;
(b) a more land-scarce economy with both technologies in use but binding labor supply constraint such that
lh = lh, and (c) an economy with very small land-labor ratios where the horn technology does not operate.
Grain and horn production
We start by describing the equilibrium where both technologies operate (wh > wF;g) and peasant con-
sumption exceeds subsistence (Ip > c). Market clearing in this case requires that total income (peasant
20households’ wages and the landlord’s rents) is spent on grain and horn consumption:
N(wM;g + wF;g(1 ¡ lh) + whlh) + rT = Yg + Yh : (19)
Because land is optimally allocated between the two technologies, rental rates in horn and grain production
equalize. Thus, r isgivenby(13). Substitutingforr, using(6)and(8), dividingbythenumberofhouseholds












We now have a system of 5 equations: (10), (12), (15), the third case of (18), and (20) with 5 unknowns:
wM;g, wF;g, wh, lh, and th, which we solve numerically. This completes case (a). Next, we turn to (b).
With falling land-labor ratios, peasant consumption approaches the subsistence level. The marginal
utility of consumption surges, boosting female labor supply. Eventually, the female labor supply constraint
becomes binding: lh = lh, representing the second case in (18). As long as both technologies operate, the
remaining equations are unchanged. This completes the two cases where both grain and horn goods are
produced. Next, we turn to the grain-only economy – case (c).
Only grain production
For small land-labor ratios, Corollary 1 implies that women’s (shadow) wages in horn fall below their
counterpart in grain. This pushes women out of horn labor – it is more proﬁtable for them to contribute to
home grain production. Consequently, lh = 0 and horn goods are not produced; (11) simpliﬁes tob lg = 1+½.
This, together with the fact that all land is dedicated to grain, i.e., tg = t, can be used to obtain male and
female wages from (9) and (10). Women marry immediately when turning adults, and birth rates do not
depend on economic conditions; they are constant and high, b = ¼. This completes the description of all
variables when only grain is produced. We have now solved the model for all three cases for given land-labor
ratios.
3.6 Simulation
In this section we solve the system of equations described above. Before turning to the simulation results,
we calibrate our model.
Calibration
To calibrate our model parameters for Western Europe, we focus on England, where births were particularly
responsivetoeconomicconditions(Lee,1981;WrigleyandSchoﬁeld,1981). Thelaborsharesofproduction
21in grain and horn are central for our model. We use ®g = 0:7 and ®h = 0:4.36 For the productivity of
women relative to men in grain we use ½ = 0:5, reﬂecting the observation that English women’s wages were
equivalent to 50-63% of English male wages (Kussmaul, 1981; Allen, 2009). Turning to the demographic
parameters, we choose ¼ = 3 (peasant families have three children when women do not work in horn),
b = 2 (two children is the lower bound for birth rates). This is the simplest way to incorporate the fact that
EMP avoided up to one third of all births (Clark, 2007). Our choice of ¹ = 0:3 ensures that fertility does not
converge back completely to ¼ when reaching its maximum level. Next, we choose TFP in grain and horn,
Ag = 1:45 and Ah = 1:50. Together with ®g, ®h, and ½, this ensures that the horn technology becomes
feasible before consumption reaches the subsistence level, allowing EMP to emerge. These parameters
also grant that wM;g > wh for the relevant range of T=N, which ensures that men only work in grain
production.37 We refer to subsistence income in England as the level during the early 14th century famine,
when few horn products were consumed (see Table 3), and normalize c = 1. For the elasticity of death
rates with respect to income we use 'd = ¡0:55, as estimated by Kelly (2005) for the period 1541-1700 in
England, using weather shocks as a source of exogenous variation. Finally, we choose d0 = 0:95¼ in (2).
This implies that the pre-plague steady state involves close-to-subsistence income, as shown below.
Simulation results for given T=N
In this section, we present all model results as a function of land per peasant household, t = T=N. Figure
4 shows the allocation of labor between horn (lh) and grain (1 ¡ lh), together with fertility – which in turn
results from lh according to (1). Figure 5 illustrates the allocation of land and income shares as functions
of t. In addition, both ﬁgures show the cutoff-points for relative wages (wh = wF;g) and peasant household
income (Ip(lh) = c) that follow from (18).
[Insert Figure 4 here]
For very small land-labor-ratios, the horn technology does not operate because wh · wF;g, and no land is
allocated to horn production. Birth rates are high because couples marry early, given that women do not
work in husbandry. As land per household increases, the horn technology becomes economically viable
(wh > wF;g). Because consumption is still below subsistence (Ip(lh) · c), incentives to work are huge.
Female labor supply is at its upper bound lh, such that only b = b children are born per peasant household.
The landlord now uses part of his soil for horn production and dedicates less to grain. The use of the more
land-intensive horn production leads to a redistribution of overall income from peasant households to the
36This is calculated as follows: We take the estimates of revenue and cost on arable and pastoral farms from Allen (1988) and
combine them with the ﬁgures for labor cost per acre from Allen (1991). We ﬁnd that both relative to costs and revenue, labor’s
share in pastoral farming is approximately half of the value in arable production. Ideally, we would want to compare labor cost with
total value added. This is not available. Apostolides et al. (2008) show an average labor share in English agriculture, 1380-1700,
of 0.5. According to their ﬁgures, arable production was 32% of total agricultural production, while pastoral farming accounted for
68%. We chose ®g = 0:7 and ®h = 0:4 so that the average weight of labor in agriculture is identical with the observed value of
0.5: 0:32 £ 0:7 + 0:68 £ 0:4 = 0:496.
37Before the plague, T=N ¼ 0:3, and this ﬁgure rises to roughly 0.55 after the plague. With our parameters, wM;g > wh holds
for T=N < 0:85.
22landlord.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Finally, we consider the case where soil is abundant enough to allow for above-subsistence wages
(Ip(lh) > c). Female labor supply decreases with growing t, because the need for consumption (and thus
work in the more rewarding horn sector) becomes less severe. Facing a trade-off between consumption and
family life, richer households opt for the latter. This subsistence effect is responsible for the upward sloping
fertility schedule in the vicinity of the cut-off point Ip(lh) = c. Fertility rises with the land-labor-ratio,
but does not reach the previous extreme level where horn production did not occur. This reﬂects the main
features of EMP – a downward shift of birth rates with a simultaneous upward-sloping pattern. Eventu-
ally, for large t, the subsistence effect loses importance, and the relative wage effect dominates: wh=wF;g
grows in tandem with t, which renders work in horn more attractive. This explains the slightly downward
sloping fertility for high land-labor ratios. However, for our analysis the region with close-to-subsistence
consumption is the relevant one, and there fertility increases in the land-labor ratio.
Steady States and Magnitude of EMP’s Impact
We now turn to the steady states and the contribution of EMP to sustaining higher p.c. income levels after
the Black Death. The left panel of Figure 6 shows that two steady states exist for an economy in which EMP
can emerge.38 The ﬁrst steady state (EL) has high population pressure and low p.c. income, and the second
(EH) involves lower fertility and higher peasant income. In our calibration, peasant household income in
EH is about 20% above the pre-plague level. Both steady states are stable, and the plague can induce the
transition from EL to EH. This occurs when the increase in land-labor ratios is large enough to trigger
the emergence of EMP, such that birth rates fall below death rates and the economy converges to EH from
the left. Very large population losses can push the economy beyond EH, from where it converges back to
EH. The latter captures the European experience, where wages surged in the aftermath of the plague and
decreased as population recovered – remaining, however, above their pre-plague level.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Next, we compare our model’s prediction with historical estimates of the elasticity of birth rates with
respect to income, 'b. We assume that birth rates are not responsive to income before the Black Death, so
that 'before
b = 0. After the plague, EMP makes birth rates increasing in income such that 'after
b = 1:41,
as estimated by Kelly (2005).39 Kelly’s 2005 elasticity estimates are based on short-run exogenous income
variation (weather shocks). To create a comparable variation in our model, we hold T=N ﬁxed at its steady
state level in EH. We then simulate the model when TFP shocks affect Ag and Ah in the same proportion –
38To allow an immediate interpretation of the magnitudes involved, the ﬁgure plots peasant household income on the horizontal
axis. See Figure 4 for the same plot with T=N on the x-axis.
39Similar to (2), the equation b = b0
¡ ¹ Cp=c
¢'b determines birth rates as a function of average peasant consumption, ¹ Cp. We
choose b
before
0 = ¼ and b
after
0 = 2=3¼, such that birth rates drop by 1/3 at the onset of EMP.
23that is, we assume that weather shocks are not sector-biased. The right panel in Figure 6 shows the results
of this exercise – given by the dots around the steady state EH (corresponding to TFP shocks of up to 15%).
The implied slope compares well with the one corresponding to Kelly’s 2005 estimates (dashed line). Note
that for our model structure, 'b is not constant. In a ﬁnal comparative exercise, we show the magnitude
of EMP’s impact under the assumption that 'b is constant once income exceeds subsistence. This results
in a new steady state E0
H, with an income-increase of about 30%. This number is broadly similar – if
slightly larger – than our model prediction. Our ﬁndings underline the importance of fertility restriction for
increasing living standards in early modern Europe. At the same time, it is clear that EMP alone cannot
account for all of the European (English) lead in terms of per capita income in 1700. Additional factors may
include a different mortality regime, as well as (to a limited extent) technological change. We examine the
contributions of these factors in Voigtländer and Voth (2008) in detail.
The Decline of EMP
In addition to explaining the emergence of EMP, our model can also account for its decline in the wake
of the Industrial Revolution (see Figure 2). With increasing productivity, subsistence consumption can be
attained at ever smaller T=N ratios. Thus, point B in Figure 3 is shifted to the left. At the same time,
assuming that Ag and Ah grow at similar rates, the location of point A does not change (see equation (16)).
Eventually, B will lie to the left of A, and EMP vanishes. With growing productivity, the subsistence effect
loses its importance, such that birth rates are no longer upward sloping in p.c. income. This concludes
the discussion of our mechanism. Next, we use our theoretical insights to shed light on the differential
international experience in the aftermath of the Great Plague.
4 International Comparisons
Western Europe was not the only area to suffer from the Black Death and other devastating plagues. Yet it
is the only one to have evolved a regime of fertility restriction based on a socio-economic institution that
avoided births through delayed marriage. In this section, we examine how other regions fared – and why
they did not evolve a similar way of reducing fertility. Following our argument above, speciﬁc European
characteristics triggered the emergence of EMP. Below we argue that other regions had less favorable char-
acteristics in the sense of Corollary 2. Thus, EMP did not emerge, and p.c. incomes converged back to the
high-population / low income steady state after major population losses.
4.1 Divergence within Europe
Fertility control in Northwestern Europe was particularly stringent. In Southern Europe, EMP reduced
fertility by less. In Eastern Europe, EMP did not exist at all. Why did such contrasts prevail within Europe?
In Southern Europe, both age at ﬁrst marriage and the percentage never marrying were lower than in the
Northwest. Population recovered relatively quickly from the impact of the Black Death. In Italy and Spain,
24it returned to the pre-1350 peak by the 16th century. In contrast, England probably did not reach pre-plague
populationlevelsuntilthe17thoreventhe18thcentury.40 RapidrecoveryofSouthernEuropeanpopulations
also reversed post-plague wage gains. Changes in agriculture were less pronounced. In particular, while the
temporary spike in incomes after 1350 improved wages, it did not lead to the evolution of service as a
standard phase in the transition from childhood to adulthood. If the shock of the plague was similar, why
did it not cause a similar host of social and economic changes? According to Corollary 2, Ah=Ag is crucial.
We argue that low horn productivity Ah prevented the emergence of EMP in Southern Europe, while high
grain productivity Ag had the same effect in Eastern Europe.
Agricultural conditions in Mediterranean countries did not favor the pastoral farming of the type com-
mon in Northwestern Europe. Land productivity was often even lower than in Northern Europe. In partic-
ular, low rainfall made it impossible to keep large herds of cattle and sheep in the same area year-round.
Transhumance – the driving of livestock from one area to another – is an ancient custom in Mediterranean
countries, with numerous routes recorded as far back as Roman times. The most famous is arguably the
Spanish Mesta – a council of shepherds that controlled transhumance under a grant from the Spanish King,
allowing them to drive their ﬂocks across a vast stretch of territory extending from Extremadura and Andalu-
sia to Castile.41 Thus, where the grass was not green enough for year-round husbandry, female employment
opportunities were reduced. Traversing sparsely populated areas on their own was not compatible with
women’s social role in early modern Europe. Work in husbandry remained a male occupation. Without the
rise of service in husbandry as a typical phase in young woman’s life, marriage ages remained low.42
In Eastern Europe, grain productivity was unusually high. Especially in Western Russia and Ukraine,
land is unusually fertile (Nunn and Qian, 2009). Thus, after the plague, landlords continued to farm their
estates using serf labor in arable production. During the early modern period, large grain surpluses were
often exported. In addition, the plague did not strike with the same force as it did in Western Europe.
Instead of arriving from Mongolia via the Russian steppes, the disease took a detour via the Black Sea
and the Mediterranean to reach Europe. Population declines in Eastern Europe were therefore probably
smaller than they were in the West. In the presence of high grain productivity, and without a major jump in
land-labor ratios, cattle and sheep farming remained uncompetitive vis-a-vis grain production.43
40There is considerable uncertainty about the size of the pre-plague population in England. Slow recovery was not a universal
feature of the Northwestern European experience – the Netherlands experienced rapid population growth (Pamuk, 2007).
41Originally, shepherds took advantage of the agricultural no-man’s-land between Christian and Muslim areas of control. Grad-
ually, the use became institutionalized.
42Similar questions could be raised about the non-emergence of EMP in the early medieval period, when land-labor ratios were
high. For the emergence of EMP, a large-scale, commercial-operated ’horn’ sector is key. While we do not explicitly model this
aspect, functioning markets for relatively long-distance trade were crucial. These did not exist in the early Middle Ages.
43Similar questions could be raised about the non-emergence of EMP in the early medieval period, when land-labor ratios were
high. For the emergence of EMP, a large-scale, commercial-operated ’horn’ sector is key. While we do not explicitly model this
aspect, functioning markets for relatively long-distance trade were crucial. These did not exist in the early Middle Ages.
254.2 Comparison with China
Can our model account for the different experience in China? The Middle Kingdom also suffered from a
devastating plague outbreak in the 14th century. Why did the same shock, in an area sufferingfrom declining
marginal returns to labor, not lead to the emergence of a ’low pressure’ demographic regime? We argue that
high Chinese grain productivity Ag was key.
Grain production in China was approximately 4 times more efﬁcient than in England. We use the ﬁgures
by Allen (2009) on output per acre and output per day, weighting them with a labor share of 0.5.44 Chinese
land productivity was 700% of English land productivity in grain, and labor productivity was 86%. This
implies a weighted average of 392%. The main reason for high land productivity was the limited size
of plots: Chinese farms were markedly smaller, and labor input per acre much higher, than in England.
Continuous population pressure led to increasing subdivision of farms. Table 4 compares farm sizes in the
most advanced areas – England and the Yangtze Delta. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, English farms
were thus, on average, 150 times larger than Yangtze ones.
[Insert Table 4 here]
High productivity in Chinese grain production reﬂected the use of numerous techniques designed to
raise output per unit of land. All of them required more labor – rice paddy cultivation, the use of bean cake
as fertilizer, and intercropping with wheat (Goldstone, 2003; Brenner and Isett, 2002). The relatively low
productivity of grain production in England is reﬂected in its low share in total output. Arable production
accounted for only 32% of agricultural output in England, according to Apostolides et al. (2008)’s ﬁgures.45
In contrast, grain accounted for almost all of China’s agricultural production.
While Chinese farms used all means available to raise output per unit of land, the same is not true of
output per worker. Ever fewer draft animals were in use. While Chinese 16th century writers observed that
’the labor of ten men equals that of one ox,’46 the use of draft animals declined in the Ming (1368-1644)
and Qing (1644-1911) period. Animal use disappeared almost entirely, except for the most arduous tasks,
by the mid-Qing period.47 The reason is that land needed to feed an ox was dear. Most farms were also too
small for keeping an ox.
Ever smaller farm sizes in China also meant that there was much less scope for female employment
in agriculture. Labor requirements could be satisﬁed by the existing male labor force on small plots. As
Li (1998) has argued, women were increasingly rendered superﬂuous for agricultural tasks, which were
also less and less well-matched to their comparative advantages. They consequently sought employment
outside agriculture, in home production of textiles through spinning and weaving. Overall, the market
value of female labor declined during the Ming and Qing periods, as a result of falling labor productivity
combinedwithchangesinthepatternofproductionarisingfromgrowing’agriculturalinvolution’(Berkeley,
44From his ﬁgures, we derive an estimate of output per acre in arable farming in the midlands of 3.5 pounds per acre.
45Allen (2009) implies a somewhat higher ﬁgure of 44%
46Cited after Brenner and Isett (2002).
47The view is controversial. Wider availability of bean cake may have helped the increased use of oxen after 1620 (Allen, 2009).
261963). Even authors skeptical of the involution hypothesis conclude that female market wages were only
25% of male wages in 1820s China, whereas English women’s market wages were equivalent to 50-63%
of English male wages (Kussmaul, 1981; Allen, 2009).48 Since plowing with oxen had disappeared, the
strength requirements of grain and rice production were lower. This eroded the relative male advantage in
the grain (rice) sector. Therefore, ½ was higher than in Europe. As our Corollary 2 argues, this made the
emergence of EMP more difﬁcult. In sum, large Ag paired with relatively high ½ in China avoided the shift
to pastoral agriculture and thus the emergence of a female labor market.
To capture the Chinese experience in our model, we leave all parameters unchanged except one – grain
productivity in China is higher, i.e., AChina
g > A
England
g , while A
England
h = AChina
h . Above, we derived an
estimate of AChina
g = 4 ¢ A
England
g . In our calibration, as soon as AChina
g > 1:5 ¢ A
England
g , EMP does not
emerge. This follows from Proposition 2 because AChina









Intuitively, grain is so productive in China that horn becomes economically viable only for large T=N
ratios. However, at this point p.c. income is high, and the subsistence effect is weak, such that birth rates
do not rise with income. Consequently, the plague does not trigger the emergence of a demographic regime
comparable to EMP in China. After the plague, wages converge back to the only long-run equilibrium EL.
Another implication of AChina
g > A
England
g is that land-labor ratios for any given wage are higher in England
– more land is needed to sustain a given population – as shown in the lower panel of Figure 7.50 This
theoretical ﬁnding reﬂects the ﬁndings in Allen (2009), who shows that English agriculture operated with
land-labor ratios that were higher than Chinese ones by a factor of 9.5.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
In a paradoxical way, China’s high land productivity, as emphasized by the revisionist ’California
School’ (Pomeranz, 2000; Goldstone, 2003), undermined its chances of adopting fertility limitation along
English lines. Our minimalist model thus captures ﬁve important elements of the divergence between Eng-
land and China: (i.) No market for female labor outside the household in China, (ii.) Limited livestock
production, (iii.) Low land-labor ratios, (iv.) High(er) fertility through early (and near-universal) marriage,
and (v.) Lower per capita incomes.
5 Conclusion
Why did Europe evolve a system of delayed marriage that reduced fertility centuries before the rest of the
world? We argue that the impact of the Black Death was key. Fertility restriction emerged as an indirect
48In our model, female market wages are represented by wh. Low wh=wM;g is thus an indicator for relatively high productivity





g has two effects on China relative to England: First, it decreases wh=wF;g, shifting point A in Figure 3 to the
right. Second, it raises p.c. income for given land-labor ratios, shifting point B to the left. If this relocates B to the left of A, EMP
does not emerge.
50The kink in English peasant household income results from the higher average land intensity of production when the horn
sector starts operating. This redistributes total income in favor of the landlord (see the right panel of Figure 5).
27consequence of high land-labor ratios after 1348-50. The Black Death reduced population by between one
third and half. Land-labor ratios rose markedly. This favored the sector that used land more intensively
– ’horn’ production (Campbell, 2000). Many more cattle were kept for meat and milk, and many more
sheep for mutton and wool. The rise of large-scale livestock farming strengthened women’s economic role.
Female labor is better suited to shepherding and milking than to ploughing or threshing. Owners of large
estates began to switch from arable farming, with its high demand for adult male labor, to husbandry, which
required less strenuous labor, some of which could be supplied by women. In this way, the plague raised the
demand for female labor.
Women mainly worked on farms as servants in husbandry, milking cows and shepherding ﬂocks of
sheep. Workingasaservantinvolvedaswitchfromtheparentalhouseholdtothemaster’s. Contractsforbade
marriage. By working as servants for a few years, women could earn and save, raising their prospects of a
good match in the marriage market. Because the Black Death changed the pattern of production and raised
the demand for female labor, it also reduced fertility rates through a higher age at ﬁrst marriage. We thus
explain the concurrent emergence of late marriage, higher incomes, and low fertility.
As a consequence, even in a Malthusian world, the ’iron law of wages’ need not hold. If death schedules
or birth schedules change, steady-state incomes can change substantially. The equilibrating forces in such a
world may still be ’Malthusian,’ but they need not lead incomes back to the same equilibrium point.51 We
argue that changes in European fertility behavior were important for the persistence of unusually high per
capitaincomeslongbeforetheIndustrialRevolution. Inparticular, fertilityrestrictionthroughthe’European
Marriage Pattern’ helped to avoid the downsides of high fertility apparent in other parts of the world. By
stabilizing incomes at a high level by 1700, EMP may well have laid some of the foundations for Europe’s
early transition to self-sustaining growth (Voigtländer and Voth, 2006). EMP also reduced the volatility of
income – bad shocks were partly compensated by lower fertility. In models in the spirit of Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997) and Greif and Sasson (2009), this facilitates the transition to self-sustaining growth.
Our model can also account for the divergent fortunes of Europe compared to China. China was subject
to a similar plague shock as Europe. Nonetheless, China did not develop a system of fertility restriction
through late marriage. Marriage remained universal, and occurred early. We argue that this was an indirect
consequence of high land productivity in Chinese agriculture. Rice paddies were highly productive; inter-
cropping with wheat raised output per acre in China further. This turned out to be a mixed blessing. High
land productivity acted as a barrier to adopting land-using and labor-saving technologies such as livestock
farming. Paradoxically, one of the weaknesses of the European agricultural system – low land productivity
– facilitated the emergence of a low fertility regime after the Black Death.
51Mokyr and Voth (2009) distinguish between a weak and a strong form of the Malthusian model, where the former is subject to
the same equilibrating forces, and the latter implies the ’iron law of wages.’
28Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2
By deﬁnition, EMP requires that lh in equation (18) be decreasing in household income over some range
of t = T=N, such that birth rates are increasing. As a ﬁrst step, we re-arrange the third line of (18) using
(10):52










Using b = ¼(1 ¡ lh) we obtain:
b = b + ¹(Z(t) + lh) (A.2)
EMP therefore requires Z(t) to be increasing in t over some range.53 Throughout the proof, we thus focus






























In order to analyze this expression, we obtain dwF;g=dt from (10) and (15), and d(wh=wF;g)=dt from (16).
dwF;g
dt


































Both derivatives are positive because of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. Throughout the proof, we use the
notation tA ´ T
N
¯ ¯
wh=wF;g (T=N at which horn becomes viable) and tB ´ T
N
¯ ¯
Ip(lh)=c (T=N at which
consumption exceeds subsistence). Because the horn technology does not operate below tA, it is sufﬁcient
to focus on t ¸ tA.
We now turn to the ﬁrst part of the proof – the "if" part of the proposition, showing thatZ(t) is increasing
over some range of t if tA < tB, and that b is below its maximum level. The upper panel of Figure 8
illustrates the underlying intuition: We show that Z(t) = ¡lh in point B, is increasing for all t up to (and in
some range beyond) point C, and that Z(t) eventually becomes decreasing and converges to zero as t grows
large.54 Following (A.2), this means that b = b in B, and then increases over some range (beyond C) – this
reﬂects EMP. Eventually, b becomes decreasing in t and converges to b + ¹lh.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
52Note that wM + wF;g = ((1 + ½)=½)wF;g.
53Peasant household income grows hand-in-hand with t over the range where horn is economically viable (wh > wF;g).
54Note that B lies to the left of C because Ip(lh) = ((1 + ½)=½)wF;g + lh(wh ¡ wF;g) > ((1 + ½)=½)wF;g for all t > tA.
29In point B, we have Ip(lh) = ((1+½)=½)wF;g+lh(wh¡wF;g) = c. Re-arranging this expression yields
Z(tB) = ¡lh. For land-labor ratios up to point C,
1+½














in (A.3). The remaining term in the denominator in (A.3) is positive because tB > tA. Consequently, Z is
strictly increasing in t for t · tC. In addition, since Z(t) and Z0(t) are continuous, and since Z0(tC) > 0,
there exists a ± > 0 s.t. 8~ t 2 (tC;tC + ±), Z(~ t) > 0 and Z0(~ t) > 0. That is, Z(t) is positive and increasing
over some range to the right of C. Next, we show that Z0(t) becomes negative, and Z(t) converges to zero





























The denominator of this expression is positive, and so is d(th=lh)=dt by Proposition 1. Thus, we can
focus on the sign of the numerator in (A.5). The ﬁrst term in the numerator is constant, the second term
converges to zero as t grows large, and the third term increases, following (A.4). Thus, for large enough t
the numerator becomes negative such that Z0 < 0.55 Finally, we show that limt!1(Z(t)) = 0. This follows
from (A.1): As t ! 1, the denominator of Z becomes large while c=wF;g goes to zero (both because of
(A.4)). Altogether, this delivers the shape of Z(t) shown in the upper panel of Figure 8. Finally, we show
that b < b over some range that also involves b0(t) > 0 (that is, there exists a range of t over which both
criteria for EMP are fulﬁlled). The latter holds unambiguously for tB · t · tC. In addition, in the vicinity
of point B, birth rates b are close to b < ¼, such that b < ¼. Formally, 9 ² > 0 s.t. 8tB · ~ t < tB+² : b < ¼.
This completes the "if" part of the proof.
Wenowturntothe"onlyif"partoftheproof. ItsufﬁcestoshowthatforalltA > tB, Z0(t) < 0;8t > tA,
such that birth rates b are never upward sloping in t, i.e., EMP never emerges. The lower panel of Figure
8 illustrates the functional form of Z. We begin by showing that Z0(t) becomes large and negative as t
converges to tA from above. If t # tA, wh # wF;g. Since wF;g=wh ! 1, (A.5) simpliﬁes and we can derive
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This result follows because (i) the numerator in (A.6) is negative and ﬁnite. To see this, note that ®g > ®h
and ((1+½)=½)wF;g > c.56 Using the latter in (A.1) also implies that limwh#wF;g Z(t) = 1, as shown in the
lower panel of Figure 8. (ii) The denominator converges to zero from above, and (iii), lh=th and d(th=lh)=dt
55Taking the limit of each term divided by the denominator, it is straightforward to show that Z
0(t) converges to zero from below































The last inequality follows because Z
0 < 0 for large t, such that (A.1) implies dlh=dt > 0. Finally, 1=lh is ﬁnite: As we show
below, limt!1(Z(t)) = 0, such that following (A.1), limt!1(lh(t)) = (1 ¡ ¹)lh > 0.
56Thelatterholds because for all t > tB: Ip(lh) > c, and limwh#wF;g Ip(lh) = limwh#wF;g((1+½)=½)wF;g+lh(wh¡wF;g) =
((1 + ½)=½)wF;g.
30are both positive and ﬁnite (see footnote 55 for the latter).
Next, we show that Z0(t) is negative for all t > tA (and thus wh > wF;g). Since the denominator in
(A.5) is positive and ﬁnite (t > tA ) wh > wF;g), it is sufﬁcient to show that the numerator remains
negative as t increases beyond tA. To demonstrate this, we label the numerator in (A.5) NUM(t) and show
that NUM0(t) < 0; 8t > tA. In other words, the numerator becomes more negative as t increases. Using




























The inequality holds because d(th=lh)=dt > 0 and ((1 + ½)=½)wF;g > c > (wF;g=wh)c for all t > tA.57
Finally, we have already shown that limt!1(Z(t)) = 0 (this holds irrespective of tA 7 tB). Altogether,
the second part of the proof shows that Z0 is negative and large for t # tA, remains negative for all t > tA,
and converges to zero from below as t ! 1. ¤
A.2. Proof of Corollary 2
Point A in Figure 3 lies to the left of B if (Ip(lh)=c)
¯ ¯
t=tA < 1, i.e., if Ip(lh) < c in point A. Horn



















, where ®g > ®h. Next, (3) simpliﬁes to Ip = wM;g + wF;g



























at point A, which is increasing in ½ and Ag, and
is decreasing in Ah. Therefore, conditions (i)-(iii) make (Ip(lh)=c)
¯
¯
t=tA < 1 more likely to hold. ¤
57From footnote 56 we know that ((1 + ½)=½)wF;g > c at t = tA, and (A.4) shows that wF;g is increasing in t. In addition, for
t > tA, wF;g=wh < 1.
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Farm servants relative to total labor
Source: Data from Kussmaul (1981). Females unmarried: Pop-
ulation aged twenty and over who are not married. Total labor
force: All hired labor in agriculture (male and female). The
sample reﬂects predominantly agricultural registration districts in
England. Cross-sectional variation is by county, 1851. The re-
gression line has a slope of .13 and is highly signiﬁcant (t-stat
3.56).
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Decade
Age at marriage ANG
Source: Kussmaul (1981). ANG measures the relative strength of spring-to-
fall marriage seasonality. Servants in pastoral agriculture typically married
after the lambing season – in spring. Workers in grain production married after
the harvest in fall. Thus, ANG shows the extent to which a marriage pattern
is pastoral; high ANG means many servants working in the animal-producing
sector. As employment in pastoral agriculture in England declined, the age at
ﬁrst marriage for women also fell sharply.
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Female labor supply in horn
lh
A B
Note: For land-labor ratios below point A, the horn technology does not op-
erate, such that female labor in horn is zero. At point A, the horn technology
becomes economically viable (wh > wF;g). Between A and B, household
income is below subsistence (Ip · c), implying large marginal returns to con-
sumption and thus maximum female labor in horn (lh = lh). To the right of B,
the subsistence effect becomes less important as T=N increases, and lh falls.
39Figure 4: Female labor and fertility
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Figure 5: Land allocation and income shares
Allocation of land
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40Figure 6: Steady states and EMP’s impact on p.c. income
Steady states of the calibrated economy




































Steady states with constant birth elasticity






































Figure 7: Long-run equilibria in England and China
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42Table 1: Age of marriage and marital fertility in seventeenth century Europe
Average Age of Women Cumulative Marital







Source: Flinn (1981). Note: Cumulative marital fertility = number of
live births per married women aged 20 to 44.
Table 2: Marital fertility rates (births per year and woman)
Age Hutterites Western Europe China
before 1800
20-24 0.55 0.45 0.27
25-29 0.502 0.43 0.25
30-34 0.447 0.37 0.22
35-39 0.406 0.3 0.18
40-44 0.222 0.18 0.12
Source: Clark (2007).
43Table 3: Agricultural output before and after the Black Death
Output per head of population
Milk (gallons) Beef (lb) Veal (lb) Mutton (lb) Pork (lb) Wool (lb)
1265 77 29 3 62 32 17
1348 55 20 3 98 13 24
1550 137 46 7 141 50 26
1700 281 89 16 189 98 40
Ratio 1550/1348 2.5 2.3 2.8 1.4 3.8 1.1
Source: Apostolides et al. (2008)
Table 4: Average farm size in England, China, and the Yangzi delta 1300-1850 (acres)
Year 1279 c.1400 c.1600 c.1700 1750 c.1800 1850
England 13.9 72 75 151
China 4.2 3.4 2.5
Big Yangzi delta 3.75 1.875 1.875 1.25 1.16 1.04
Small Yangzi delta 2.89 1.04
Source: Brenner and Isett (2002). English ﬁgures are from Allen (1992).
44